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TAXATION
INCOME TAXATION
Controlled Corporations -Allocation of Income
Section 4821 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 confers upon
the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate the broad power to
"distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deduction, credits, or
allowances between" businesses owned or controlled by the same
interests if he determines that such action is necessary "to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of the business.2
The Commissioner's power is discretionary, and his determination is
one of fact which, unless shown by the taxpayer to be "arbitrary and
capricious," must be affirmed.3
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482. The power conferred by section 482 is in no way
novel. The general underlying purpose of the section can be traced back to the 1921
Act. See generally 7 MERTENs, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 38.61 (1956) [hereinafter
MERTENs]. The identical language of section 482 is found in section 45 of the 1939 Code.
Consequently, much of the case law relating to section 45 is of significant value in analyz-
ing section 482 problems. For a history of the development of section 45 see National Sec.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943); Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,
31 B.T.A. 1152 (195).
2 Section 482 may be applied regardless of whether or not the controlled organizations,
trades, or businesses are incorporated or organized in the United States. "The standard to
be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with
another taxpayer." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1962). See also Local Fin. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 407 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956 (1969); Oil Base, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 862 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 885 U.S. 928 (1966). Dealings between
controlled taxpayers are subject to special scrutiny.
... In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the district
director is not restricted to the case of improper accounting, to the case of a
fraudulent, colorable, or sham transaction, or to the case of a device designed to
reduce or avoid tax by shifting or distorting income, deductions, credits, or al-
lowances.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1962). See also George W. Knipe, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 668
(1965), aff'd sub nom. Equitable Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966); Mel Dar Corp. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d
525 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963).
Only the Commissioner has the discretionary power to invoke section 482; its use is
not a matter of right with the taxpayer nor can he require the Commissioner to do so.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(3) (1962). However, the Commissioner may be estopped to deny
its use. Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd
per curiam, 339 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1964).
3 Wisconsin Big Boy Corp. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1073 (1969), aff'd, 452 F.2d 137
(7th Cir. 1971); Grenada Indust., Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 231 (1951), aft'd, 202 F.2d
873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953); Seminole Flavor Co. v. Commissioner,
4 T.C. 1215 (1945); National Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 562 (1942), aff'd, 137
F.2d 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943). However, "[t]he mere existence of
common ownership or control is not enough by itself to justify application of Section
482.... It must further be determined by the Commissioner that reallocation is necessary
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of the entities."
Plumb and Kapp, Reallocation of Income and Deductions Under Section 482, 41 TAXES
809, 813 (1963).
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
Intended "to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an
uncontrolled taxpayer," 4 the section is couched in elastic terms, indi-
cating a congressional intent to have it "construed flexibly in the light
of the peculiar circumstances of each case." 5 However, this flexibility
in terminology and resulting ambiguous limits of application foster
judicial disagreement.
In B. Forman Company v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit recently took the most liberal approach to the
applicability of section 482. Petitioners, McCurdy & Co., Inc. and B.
Forman Co., were competing retail department stores. The two were
basically close family corporations with no common shareholders or
directors. In 1958 they formed the Midtown Holding Corporation with
the intent to erect a shopping center. At all times, 50 percent of the
stock of Midtown was owned by McCurdy and 50 percent by Forman.
In 1959 McCurdy and Forman entered into an agreement which pro-
vided, inter alia, that each party was to vote its Midtown stock to pro-
vide Midtown with a board of directors that would insure the two cor-
porations of equal control. This agreement also called for loans to be
made by McCurdy and Forman to Midtown. In 1963, pursuant to their
agreement, McCurdy and Forman each loaned 51,000,000 to Midtown
evidenced by three year, interest-free notes. These notes were replaced
in 1966 by similar interest-free notes, no interest or principal having
been paid on the 1963 notes.
Invoking section 482, the Commission allocated to both McCurdy
and Forman interest income at the rate of 5 percent on these notes for
the years 1965 to 1967.8 The Tax Court reversed the Commissioner's
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1962). Underlying this intent is an assumption that the
interests controlling the businesses have "complete power to cause each controlled taxpayer
so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and accounting records truly reflect the taxable
income . . ." of each of the controlled taxpayers. Id. Should this not be the case, the
district director has the power to allocate, apportion, or distribute the gross income,
credits, deductions, or allowances, or any item affecting the taxable income, so as to arrive
at the true taxable income of each controlled taxpayer. The true taxable income is arrived
at by applying the criteria of arm's length dealing. Id. See also Central Cuba Sugar Co. v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 874 (1952).
5 Cooper, Section 45, 4 TAx L. Rav. 131, 135-36 (1949). "It is not only dangerous to
attempt to make a strict definition of these doubtful elements to be applied in every case,
it is impossible to do so." Id.
0453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972).
The record showed that Midtown was running into great debt and suffering large
business losses. While the initial projected cost of the shopping center was $8,000,000, the
actual cost exceded $18,000,000. Thus, the court of appeals found the waiver of interest
on the loans to be an attempt by petitioners to avoid increasing their taxable income. At
the same time, the waiver prevented Midtown from incurring additional business expenses
that could only have resulted in greater yearly losses. Id. at 1154.
8 The 5 percent interest charge was eventually found by the court of appeals to be
reasonable in light of Midtown's loans from parties other than the petitioners. Also, the
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determination, finding a lack of the requisite control since neither Mc-
Curdy nor Forman alone could control Midtown and since the two
competitors could not be regarded as a single entity.9 In so doing, the
Tax Court reaffirmed its long-standing holding that "where two or
more corporations owned by different sets of stockholders control an-
other corporation such other corporation is [not] controlled by the
same interests."' 0
Treasury Regulations provide that the arm's length rate to be applied where the creditor
is not regularly engaged in making loans shall be:
(i) The rate of interest actually charged if at least 4 but not in excess of 6
percent per annum simple interest,
(ii) 5 percent per annum simple interest if no interest was charged or if the
rate of interest charged was less than 4, or in excess of 6 percent per annum simple
interest,
unless the taxpayer establishes a more appropriate rate....
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(2) (1968).
9 54 T.C. 912, 922-23 (1970). Although section 482 does not define "control," the
treasury regulations do provide some guidelines. Control may be direct or indirect. "It is
the reality of the control which is decisive, not its form or the mode of its exercise." Treas.
Reg. § 1A82-1(a)(3) (1962). The early judicial view was that section 482 required common
"ownership." John L. Denning & Co. v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 288, 291 (10th Cir. 1950)
(dictum). See also Birmingham Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Davis, 112 F.2d 453, 456 (5th
Cir. 1940).
However, the modem trend seems to take a more realistic view, placing less emphasis
on percentage requirements. See Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969); Arch v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), af0'd, 358 F.2d 342
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); Hall v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 390 (1959), affd,
294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961); Grenada Indust. Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 231 (1951),
af'd, 202 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953). "Control may be determined
to be the power to direct operations of the company or establish policy for the organization.
If so, it either exists or it does not exist, so that any percentage application would be
inconsistent with the definition of control." Hewitt, Section 482-Allocation of Income and
Deductions Between Related Persons-Up to Date, N.Y.U. 22ND INsr. ON FED. TAx. 381,
385 (1964) [hereinafter Hewitt].
10 Lake Erie & P. Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 558, 565 (1945). This case presented
facts almost identical to Forman. Here two corporations, the New York Central and the
Pennsylvania Railroads, each owned 50%0 of the stock of the petitioner, the Lake Erie and
Pittsburgh Railway Co. Petitioner was initially formed by the Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Ry. Co. (the New York Cent. R.R. Co. was successor by consolidation to the
same) and the Pennsylvania Co. (the Penn. R.R. Co. was successor to the same). Pursuant
to an agreement entered into between the New York Central, the Pennsylvania Railroad,
and the petitioner, the New York Central and the Pennsylvania Railroad were permitted
to use petitioner's terminals without charge. In order to reflect the petitioner's true
taxable income, the Commissioner allocated to petitioner a portion of the gross income
of both the New York Central and the Pennsylvania Railroad. The Tax Court reversed
the Commissioner, finding that neither the New York Central nor the Pennsylvania Rail-
road controlled the petitioner. Conceding that "together" they did control the petitioner,
the court concluded that this amounted to nothing more than saying "that the stockholders
of a corporation control it." Id.
Although the Commissioner initially acquiesced to this decision, 1945 Cum. BuLL. 5,
the same was withdrawn in 1965. Rev. Rul. 65-142, 1965-1 Cum. BUL. 223. In so doing, the
Commissioner expressed his view that the Lake Erie case too narrowly contrued section
482. It was contrary to the modern trend and ignored the true reality of the circumstances.
The case has been attacked as an "unduly restricted interpretation of the phrase
'controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests."' Hewitt, Section 482-Allocation
of Income and Control Among Related Taxpayers, N.Y.U. 20th INsr. ON FED. TAx. 463,
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The court of appeals, in finding the Tax Court's holding to be
"clearly erroneous," '" reversed on the ground "that McCurdy and For-
man had the same interests in Midtown.' u2 The court first emphasized
the "reality of control"' 3 and the intent of Congress in enacting section
482. Record ownership was not the only element to be considered since
"in order to find control, no percentage requirements are specified nor
are any precise requirements necessary."' 4
After finding the necessary element of "control," the court went
on to determine that the waiver of interest on the notes was not rep-
resentative of arm's length dealings. However, petitioners argued that
the Commissioner was overstepping his authority by creating income,
and cited numerous decisions supporting the proposition that related
entities need not charge interest on loans.'; But the court determined
that to the extent such decisions would prevent allocation in the present
case, they were inconsistent with "economic reality, or with the de-
clared purpose of section 482."'16
The decision stands for a marked widening of the applicability of
472 (1962). See also Hewitt, supra note 9, at 384-85; Plumb, Jr. and Kapp, Reallocation
of Income and Deductions Under Section 482, 41 TAXEs 809, 812-13 (1963). Compare Lake
Erie & P. Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, supra, with Texsun Supply Corp. v. Commissioner, 17
T.C. 433 (1951).
11Reversal here required a showing that the Tax Court's decision was dearly er-
roneous. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
12 453 F.2d at 1155.
13 See note 9 supra.
14453 F.2d at 1153. By refusing to follow the Lake Erie case, the court took a major
step forward in the segregation of control from ownership.
15 See generally 7 MERTENS § 38.63. The purpose of section 482 is to clearly reflect
income that actually exists. It has long been held that this does not give the Commissioner
the power to create income by allocating interest, rent, etc., where none was charged or
received. See Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940);
Huber Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 598 (1971); PPG, Indust. Inc. v. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 928 (1970); Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 584
(1961); Society Brand Clothes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 304 (1952); Smith-Bridgman
& Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 287 (1951); Combs Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A.
339 (1940).
16453 F.2d at 1156. The court found support for its conclusion in the Treasury
Regulations which dearly confer upon the Commissioner the power to allocate an ap-
propriate amount of interest income where a member of a controlled group makes interest-
free loans. See Treas. Reg. § 1A82-2 (a) (1968). It should also be noted that under section
482 the Commissioner must make appropriate adjustments to all the parties concerned.
See Treas. Reg. § IA82-1(d)(2) (1968).
The court found petitioner's contention that the loans were in fact contributions to
Midtown's capital to be without merit. The 1959 agreement specifically provided for loans
to be made to Midtown, and there was no evidence that petitioners received additional
Midtown stock for the advances. 453 F.2d at 1156.
Additionally, the court affirmed the determination of the Tax Court and the Commis-
sioner that payments by petitioners to Midtown via an agreement that certain kiosks not
be built, was not an "ordinary and necessary business expense" under section 162 of the
Code. The court determined that the Tax Court was not "clearly erroneous" in finding
that such payments were camouflaged capital contributions. Id. at 1159.
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section 482 in the Second Circuity' In an effort to give effect to eco-
nomic reality and to expand the usefulness of the statute, the court of
appeals overturned an interpretation of "control" that has stood since
1945, and refused to be bound by numerous decisions opposing the
creation of income by the Commissioner. While the course other cir-
cuits will take on the issue remains to be seen, it appears that section
482 will continue to be a generative force for litigation.' 8
Travel and Entertainment Expense Deduction - Substantiation
Requirements
All revenue acts have allowed the deduction of ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses.' 9 The deduction of business expenses and losses
constitutes the bulk of statutory allowances in monetary terms. Prob-
ably no other deduction provision has historically been a greater source
of litigation than the business expense allowance. Among the various
deductions allowable as a business expense, perhaps the most fertile
ground for litigation has been the traveling expense provision.20 In
17 The case seems to follow a trend in the Second Circuit to liberally construe section
482. Another recent example of this is Phillipp Bros. Chem. v Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53
(2d Cir. 1970), afg 52 T.C. 240 (1969). Here the court affirmed the allocation of the entire
net income of five commonly controlled foreign sales corporations to the parent New York
corporation. The court, again stressing the "reality of control," found "no evidence to show
that the foreign sales corporations carried on any substantial business activities." 453 F.2d
at 58. See also 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 550 (1972).
The older view was that the identity of the businesses had to be preserved and that
the Commissioner lacked the authority under section 482 to merge several controlled
entities. See, e.g., Chelsea Products Co. v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952), aft'g
16 T.C. 840 (1951).
18 Statistics show that in the past, the Commissioner has usually been unsuccessful
when attempting to invoke section 482. See Hewitt, supra note 9, at 408. However, with
this widening of authority in Forman, history may be of little value in predicting the
validity of the Commissioner's future allocations under section 482.
19 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162; INT. REv. CODE oF 1939, § 23(a); Revenue Acts of
1938, 1936, 1934, 1932, 1928, § 23(a); Revenue Acts of 1926, 1924, 1921, 1919, §§ 214(a)(1),
234(a)(I). Prior to 1918, individuals were allowed deductions for "necessary" expenses.
Revenue Act of 1916, § 5(a); Revenue Act of 1913, § II(B). No definitive indication of the
intended effect on deductibility of the addition of the term "ordinary" is discernible
from the legislative history of the 1918 Act. See H.R. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Ses. (1918).
20 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(2). What is now section 162(a)(2) was brought into
the tax structure by section 214 of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 239. Before 1921,
section 214 had allowed a deduction of "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
... in carrying on any trade or business," without further specification. Revenue Act of
1918, 40 Stat. 1066. In T.D. 3101, 3 CuM. BuLL. 191 (1920), the Treasury Department inter-
preted the statute to allow deductions of "travelling expenses, including railroad fares,
and meals and lodging in an amount in excess of any expenditures ordinarily required for
such purposes when at home." Id. Mim. 2688, 4 Cum. BuLL. 209 (1921), gave guidelines for
determining what expenditures were "ordinarily required." Basically, the taxpayer was to
compute his pro rata share of the total costs of maintaining a home for all persons in
the household. This figure would thus represent the base for determining the excess
amount of expenses incurred while not at home. However, the Treasury Department had
some difficulty in administering the "excess" provisions of its regulations, and asked
[Vol. 47:398
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Congress to grant a deduction for the "entire amount" of such meal and lodging ex-
penditures. See Statement of Dr. T. S. Adams, Tax Adviser, Treasury Department,
Hearings on H.R. 8245 before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., at 50,
234-35 (1921). The 1921 amendment, inserting section 162(a)(2)'s allowance of a deduction
for the entire amount of qualified meals and lodging was therefore instituted to provide
"a measure of justice" to commercial travelers. 61 CONG. Rlc. 5201 (1921) (remarks of
Congressman Hawley, member of the Committee on Ways and Means). See also 61 CONG.
R c. 6673 (1921) (remarks of Senator Walsh, member of the Committee on Finance). The
Revenue Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 960, amended the provisions so that the amount expended
for meals and lodging was limited to expenditures "other than amounts which are lavish
or extravagant under the circumstances." Id. at 976-77.
The Code does not specifically allow a deduction for entertainment expenditures in-
curred for a trade or business purpose. Deductions authorized by section 162 for travel
expenses have, however, tended to include entertainment expenses. If such expenditures
are to be deductible they must meet all the tests governing the deductibility of business
expenses.
Deductions for travel and entertainment expenses (T & E) have long been a thorn in
the side of the Internal Revenue Service. Previous to World War II the issues generally
raised concerned per diem allowances for travel. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 33, arts. 4 and 8
(1937); Treas. Reg. 45, art. 292 (1937). Following the War the T & E problem mushroomed.
Administrative action was instituted. In 1952, Internal Revenue agents were instructed
to examine carefully T & E deductions on tax returns in an attempt to curb these items.
Bureau of Int. Rev. Rul. No. s-2979 (Feb. 26, 1952). In 1954, under Rev. Rul. 54-195, 1954-1
Cum. Born. 47, guidelines were established for agents in determining the deductibility of
T & E expenses so as to stop abuses. Throughout the 1950's various other administrative
attempts were made to stem the increase in T & E deductions. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 101,
art. 23(a)-2(c) (1950); Treas. Reg. 103 § 1923(a)-2(c) (1951); Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.23(a)-2(c)
(1952); Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.23(a)-2(c) (1953). These administrative attempts did not, how-
ever, meet with much success.
Until 1962, attempts to correct the T & E situation legislatively failed as well. In
1951 a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee was appointed to examine
the administration of the tax laws. The chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Cecil
G. King, declared that:
[o]ne of the most flagrant sources of inequity and of corruption has been found
in the inadequacies of the existing record-keeping requirements and enforcement
of these requirements. While the subcommittee will not sanction unreasonable re-
quirements of record-keeping, particularly in the case of millions of small taxpay-
ers, it has become clear from our investigations that under present law exorbitant
unsubstantiated deductions have frequently been claimed for such items of business
expense as entertainment and promotion. Without the power to enforce adequate
record-keeping, the Bureau of Internal Revenue has been required to allow such
deductions on an estimated basis.
Press release of Congressman Cecil B. King, May 16, 1952, in 39 TAxs 947, 950 (1961).
The King Bill, H.R. 7893, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), was not enacted, however, due to
strong business and professional pressure. Further proposals for corrective legislation were
made by Senator Clark in the 86th Congress. S. 2040, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); see also
105 CoNe. Rae. 11897 (1959). None of these proposals were accepted.
In 1961, therefore, President Kennedy recommended new legislation to deal with the
T & E problem. In a special message on our federal tax system, the President recounted
the widespread abuses which had developed through the use of the expense account:
Too many firms and individuals have devised means of deducting too many
personal living expenses as business expenses, thereby charging a large part of
their cost to the Federal Government. Indeed, expense account living has become
a byword in the American scene.
Tighter enforcement of present legislation will not suffice. Even though in some
instances entertainment and related expenses have an association with the needs
of business, they nevertheless confer substantial tax-free personal benefits to the
recipients. In other cases, deductions are obtained by disguising personal expenses
as business outlays. But under present law, it is extremely difficult to separate out
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response to the problem, Congress established section 274 of the Code
as part of the Revenue Act of 1962.21 Under this section travel and
entertainment expenses come under close scrutiny2 and make it in-
creasingly difficult for personal expenditures to be disguised as business
expenses.
Among the provisions of section 274 is the requirement that the
taxpayer must substantiate travel or entertainment expenses "by ade-
quate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating his own state-
ment" detailing the amount, time, place, and business purpose of each
such expense and the taxpayer's business relationship to the persons
entertained.23 Treasury regulations require a written statement and
and disallow such pseudobusiness expenditures. New legislation is needed to deal
with the problem.
PRESmENT KENNEDY'S M FSSAGE To CONGRESS, OuR FmERAL TAX SYsrmm, H.R. Doc. No. 140,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1961).
2176 Stat. 960, 974-77 (1962).
22To be deductible, any entertainment activity must fit either of the two categories
established by section 274(a)(1)(A). The taxpayer must either establish that (1) the activity
was directly related to the active conduct of his trade or business or (2) that the activity
was associated with the active conduct of his trade, or business in the case of an item
directly preceding or following a substantial and bona fide business discussion (including
business meetings at a convention or the like). The deduction may not exceed the portion
of the expenditure which is directly related to or associated with the active conduct of the
taxpayer's trade or business. See S. REP. No. 1881, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1961).
The regulations define "directly related" in detail. If an expenditure is otherwise
deductible, it shall be considered directly related to the taxpayer's trade or business if it
comes within one of the following categories:
(1) The expenditure is one wherein the taxpayer made or committed himself
to the expenditure at a time when he had more than a general expectation of
deriving some income or benefit (other than good will) at some indefinite future
time; and during the entertainment period to which the expenditure related, the
taxpayer actively engaged in a business meeting or other bona fide business
transaction other than entertainment, for the purpose of obtaining income or
some other business benefit; and, under the circumstances, the principal character
of the combined business and entertainment activity was the active conduct of
the taxpayer's trade or business; and, that the expenditure was attributable to the
taxpayer and a person or persons with whom the taxpayer engaged in the active
conduct of his trade or business during the entertainment, or with whom he
would have so engaged but for circumstances beyond his control;
(2) The expenditure was directly in the furtherance of the taxpayer's trade or
business and occurred in a clear business setting;
(3) The expenditure was made directly or indirectly by the taxpayer for the
benefit of an individual, other than an employee, and such expenditure repre-
sented compensation for services rendered or was paid as a prize or award;
(4) The expenditure was made with respect to a facility used by the taxpayer
for furnishing food or beverages in circumstances generally conducive to business
discussion, to the extent allocable to the furnishing of such food or beverage.
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c) (1969). The Regulations also discuss when an activity is associated
with the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d)
(1969). See also Rev. Rul. 63-144, 1963-2 Cums. BuLL. 129.
23 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 274(d). This section was in response to the great confusion
caused by the Cohan rule. In Cohan v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), George
M. Cohan had expended substantial sums in traveling and in entertaining. However, he
kept no records of these expenditures. The Commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals,
11 B.T.A. 748 (1927), refused to allow any deduction, However, the Second Circuit
[Vol. 47:398
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other corroborating evidence detailing each element of the expenditure
if adequate records have not been maintained.24
This term in Hughes v. Commissioner2 the court affirmed the Tax
Court's decision disallowing the taxpayer's entertainment expenses for
failing to meet the substantiation requirements of section 274. Hughes
was a television stage manager who frequently bought food for his
aides' consumption at cafeterias and occasionally bought them drinks
at local bars. Hughes did not keep records of the expenses thus in-
curred, nor did he retain many receipts. 26 On his tax returns for 1963
and 1964, the taxpayer claimed an estimated total expenditure each
year as a business expense deduction. These deductions were disallowed
by the Commissioner as not complying with the requirements of sec-
tion 274(d) and the treasury regulations thereunder.
In affirming the Tax Court decision, the court indicated that evi-
dence offered by the taxpayer did not constitute adequate records sub-
stantiating the expenses. Hughes offered no proof of the business
purpose of the expenses, nor did he present corroborative testimony
establishing the business relationship of the taxpayer to the persons
entertained. Furthermore, the claimed deductions lacked sufficient sub-
stantiation of the taxpayer's own statements. Since no evidence was
presented in the nature of "direct evidence, such as a statement.., of
persons entertained or other witnesses setting forth detailed informa-
remanded the case for "as dose an approximation as [can be made].... [with the burden
of justification] upon the taxpayer." 39 F.2d at 544. Subsequent to Cohan, .hundreds of
cases under which claims for deductions of business expenses on the basis of estimates
were decided. Because of the latitude permitted by such a rule, tremendous conflicts arose.
See e.g., Standard Galvanazing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1953); Estate
of Waterman v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1952); Durkee v. Commissioner, 181
F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1950). See also Rev. Rul. 54-195, 1954-1 Cum. BuuL. 47; Emanuel and
Lipoff, Travel and Entertainment: The New World of Section 274, 18 TAx I REv. 487,
516 (1962).2 4 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c)(3) (1962).
25 451 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1971).
26 The only records offered by Hughes to substantiate his expenditures were checks
and billing statements from an inn near his home, where he had bought drinks occasion-
ally for his boss and a few stagehands. The checks and statements on their face did not
differentiate those drinks bought for business guests from drinks and food bought for
Hughes' own consumption or that of his social guests. Aside from the checks and state-
ments, and Hughes' own written and oral estimates of his expenses for food and drink
both at studios and in bars, the only evidence supportive of his claimed expenses was the
oral testimony of two witnesses. One had seen Hughes buying drinks at bars and entertain-
ing stagehands at studios; however, the witness also testified that it was customary, when
stagehands were entertained, for social friends of studio personnel to be treated to the
same food or beverages. A second witness, a stage manager like the taxpayer, testified that
he had worked on many shows with Hughes and had seen him "entertaining." The second
witness also testified that as a stage manager, he himself had spent seven or eight dollars
a day on coffee, doughnuts, and sandwiches, and that non-erew persons were not excluded
when entertaining was done at studios or bars. Id. at 977-78.
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tion,"27 the alternative proof allowed under section 274 was not met.
To allow a deduction in the present case would be to "wholly disre-
gard" the statute and regulations.28 Hughes' contention that the testi-
mony of the witnesses should be given conclusive weight as sufficient
corroborative evidence was quickly dismissed.29 Although it is true that
a 'written statement may not be required for substantiation, "the cor-
roborative evidence must nevertheless establish each statutory element
-amount, time, place, and purpose- of the expenditure with preci-
sion and particularity."' 0 As the taxpayer did not nearly approach the
requisite specificity, the deductions must be disallowed.
Hughes will serve as another case delineating the disjunctive sub-
stantiation requirements provided by section 274 and the standards of
proof required thereunder. While affirming the standards established
in Laforge v. Commissioner,3 1 it evinces the Circuit's resistance to un-
necessary expansion of a sound doctrine.
Original Issue Discount
Interest paid by the issue of a bond is deductible under Section 163
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.32 However, in lieu of a stated
interest rate, some issuers will release bonds to the public at a discount.
This practice, known as "original issue discount," has been equated to
payment of a stated interest rate over the life of the issue by the Su-
preme Court.33
27Id. at 978, citing Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c)(3) (1962).
28451 F.2d at 978. The witness' statement that he had seen Hughes entertaining in
bars and at studios was much too general and insufficiently detailed, i.e., not specific as to
time, place, purpose, or amount. "Were we to hold otherwise, with a little trading back
and forth from day to day well-nigh every drink at every bar, every doughnut and every
cup of coffee bought in the United States would wind up as a deduction on somebody's tax
return." Id. Similarly, the second witness' statement that his own coffee, doughnut and
sandwich expenses averaged seven or eight dollars a day was of no corroborative value as
to Hughes' claims, "lest we establish a minimum snack expense deduction for all stage
managers." Id.
29 The taxpayer based this argument on the recent holding of the Second Circuit in
Laforge v. Commissioner, 434 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1970). For an excellent discussion of the
Laforge doctrine, see 46 ST. JoaN's I. R v. 537, 545 (1972).
30 451 F.2d at 979.
31434 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1970).
32 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a) provides
GENmAL RuLE
There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the
taxable year on indebtedness.
For possible exceptions to this general rule, see INT. Rav. CODE oF 1954, §§ 264-67.
33 United States v. Midiand-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965). The Court held that the
discount allowed by the issuer of a bond was a cost of borrowing money. For example, a
corporatipn has a choice of issuing a 20 year debenture paying 9 percent interest over its
life or issuing the instrument at 90 percent of its face value at maturity and paying only
7 percent interest over the 20 year period.
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The Internal Revenue Code itself does not directly provide a de-
duction for an original issue discount, but the Treasury Regulations,
cognizant of the use of the discounts as an alternative to stated interest,
allow a tax deduction.3 4 The term "original issue discount" is defined
as "the difference between the issue price and the stated redemption
price at maturity."8 5
In Chock Full O'Nuts Corp. v. United States, 6 petitioner at-
tempted to deduct the original issue discount on a convertible deben-
ture.87 The facts are undisputed. On or about August 1, 1964, petitioner
issued convertible subordinated debentures (69,389) having a par value
of $100, bearing 42 percent interest, due in 20 years and with a con-
version price of $28.50 per share. The equivalent value of such an issue
without the conversion feature would be $89.625 for each $100 of par
value. Petitioner, in its tax return for 1962, claimed a $35,995.58 deduc-
tion 88 for amortization of bond discount. The Commissioner denied
34Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(a)(1) (1968) provides:
Deductions for bond discount-
(a) Discount upon issuance(1) If bonds are issued by a corporation at a discount the net amount of such
discount is deductible and should be prorated or amortized over the life
of the bonds. For purposes of this section, the amortizable bond discount
equals the excess of the amount payable at maturity (or in the case of a
callable bond, at the earlier call date) over the issue price of the bond.
85 INT. REv. Con oF 1954, § 1232(b). This section first appeared in the 1954 Code to
reverse the trend toward treating an original issue discount as a capital gain. Section 1232
accomplished this objective by stipulating that gains made on the sale of corporate debt
held for more than six months, at least as to the amount attributable to the original issue
discount, would be characterized as ordinary income.
The section also contains a de minimtus rule which provides that the original issue
discount will be considered to have a zero value if the discount is less than one-fourth of
one percent of the redemption price of the security at maturity multiplied by the number
of complete years to maturity. See generally Paine and Westheimer, Original Issue Dis-
count Regulations Revised But Remain Controversial, 85 J. oF TAXATON 282 (November
1971).
"Stated redemption price at maturity" for purposes of § 1232 is defined as the amount
set at the last modification of the purchase agreement including dividends payable. For
an illustration, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(1) (1968).
"Issue price" is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2) (1968) as the "initial offering
price to the public [excluding bond houses and brokers] at which price a substantial
amount of such bonds or other evidences of indebtedness were sold." In addition, where a
convertible security is involved, the issue price will include any amount paid for the con-
version feature.
86453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971).
37 A convertible debenture is a corporate debt instrument which allows the holder
the option of waiting till maturity to collect the face value or converting the debenture
into stock of the corporation. It allows the corporate organization to enlarge its capital
while providing the holder with an option he can exercise as a hedge against inflation.
For a discussion of convertible bonds and their tax consequences, see Fleischer and Cary,
The Taxation of Convertible Bonds and Stock, 74 H-MRv. L. REV. 475 (1961).
35 Petitioner calculated the discount as follows: Number of debentures sold (69,389)
multiplied by the discount ($100 par value minus $89.625 price if issued without the con-
version feature = $10.375) equals $719,911. This total is then amortized over the life of
the bonds (20 years).
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the deduction in part and assessed the petitioner $20,741.66 for taxes
and interest. Petitioner paid the sum and sued in district court for a
refund. The district court ruled in favor of the Commissioner. 9 The
Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the amount of issue price attrib-
utable to the conversion feature does not constitute original issue dis-
count under Code section 1232.40
Petitioner contended that Internal Revenue Code section 1232
(b)(2)41 did not include the amount attributable to the conversion
feature in the "issue price." The Commissioner contended that this
question was resolved by the enactment of Treasury Regulation section
1.1232-3(b)(2)(i) which clearly includes in the issue price any sum paid
for the conversion feature.42 However, petitioner contested the at-
tempted retroactive effect of the regulation to an occurence in 1961.43
39 322 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). (judgment upon the stipulated facts, without tes-
timony, by Judge Levet).
40 453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971). Filing briefs amicus curiae were Hunt Food & Indus-
tries, Inc., J.P. Stevens & Co. Inc. and the Olin Corporation.
In a more recent judicial proceeding, the Tax Court has followed the precedent estab-
lished in Chock Full O'Nuts. See Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc., 57 T.C. 633 (1972), (deny-
ing a tax deduction for original issue discount on a convertible debenture). Petitioner in
Hunt Foods challenged Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-8(b)(2)(i) (1968), arguing that part of the
proceeds received for a convertible debenture was attributable to the conversion feature
and deductible as an additional cost of borrowing money. The Tax Court, citing Chock
Full O'Nuts, decided against the petitioner, and held that the regulations provide that
such cost of the conversion feature does not constitute an original issue discount. In addi-
tion, the court expressed the view that a convertible debenture is a "hybrid" type of
security, being neither debt nor equity. The holder can either be paid fully at maturity
or exercise the conversion feature with the issuer repaying no more than what was initially
received. For a discussion of Hunt Foods, see 3 TAX AvisOR 437 (1972).
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(1) (1968) defines "original issue discount" as "the difference
between the issue price and the stated redemption price at maturity." For purposes of this
section, "issue price" is defined as "the initial offering price to the public" at which a sub-
stantial amount of the obligations are sold. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(i) (1968).
42Treas. Reg. § 1.1232(b)(2)(i) (1968), when promulgated, was made retroactive to all
obligations issued after December 31, 1954. The regulation provides that "any amount paid
in respect of the conversion privilege" is to be considered as part of the issue price. Apply-
ing this provision to the petitioner's contention, it is clear that there would be no original
issue discount since the issue price and the stated redemption price were identical.
43 Under INT. REv. Coop or 1954, § 7805(b) the Commissioner is allowed to establish
the extent to which regulations will be treated retroactively.
The Secretary or his delegate may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling
or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without re-
troactive effect.
To date it has been the Commissioner's intention that every Revenue Ruling be given
retroactive effect unless retroactivity has been specifically excluded. Rev. Proc. 68-87, 1968-2
CuM. BuLL. 926. However, in promulgating retroactive rulings the Commissioner must
avoid abusing his discretion. As expressed by the court in International Business Machines
Corp. v. United States, 843 F.2d 914, 920 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 882 U.S. 1028 (1966),
"[t]he Internal Revenue Service does not have carte blanche. Its choice must be a rational
one, supported by relevant considerations." In the end it is up to the court to decide what
statutes will be given retroactive effect. May Seed & Nursery Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d




The court sidestepped the question of retroactivity by deciding that,
under the regulations that had been promulgated at the date of issu-
ance, the conversion feature was not an original issue discount.4
In addition, the court concluded that petitioner had not met the
burden of establishing that the amount allocated to the conversion
feature constituted a cost of borrowing money that must "without
qualification be paid."' 4 5
In the alternative, petitioner attempted to equate the convertible
debentures to a bond-warrant investment unit.46 The court soundly
rejected this contention on the ground that the convertible issue is an
indivisible investment unit while the bond-warrant type of issue con-
tains two independent obligations.47
The court indicated that an amount paid for a conversion feature
is usually attributable to equity transactions and not debt as argued by
petitioner. s
With the Second Circuit's Chock Full O'Nuts opinion and the
Tax Court's Hunt decision,49 it would appear that the use of converti-
ble debentures will diminish, possibly to be replaced by the bond-
warrant type of issue. But, considering the large number of convertible
debentures already issued, it would also appear that there will be more
litigation.
A possible compromise would be the allowance of the current de-
44453 F.2d at 303. The court concluded there was no evidence to support the peti-
tioner's contention that "offering price" was intended to include only the investment ele-
ment of a convertible bond. See Note, The Tax Consequences of Convertible Bonds, 49
B.U.L. REv. 96, 102-03 (1969).
In Hunt Foods, the Tax Court took the approach that the regulation would be given
retroactive effect although it based its decision on other grounds.
45 Convertible debentures may be satisfied in two ways. One alternative permits the
holder to convert the issue into stock by surrendering it to the corporation. In this case,
it will not be paid at maturity and the debenture is considered to be satisfied. To allow
the deduction of a discount in this situation would be to ignore the concept of establishing
the discount as a cost of borrowing money. The second alternative is for the holder to
wait until maturity to collect, thus terminating the conversion feature and resulting in the
issuer paying out no more than was received when the security was issued. 453 F.2d at 304.
For a discussion of whether a convertible debenture is debt or equity, see Thrower, Con-
glomerates and Convertibles, 1 TAX ADVISOR 4 (1970).
46 Bond-warrant investment units consist of a bond obligation as well as warrants
(options) for the purchase of stock, each of which may be taken separately. Bond-warrant
units can be distinguished from convertible debentures. For example, with a convertible
bond, the holder must choose either to exercise the conversion feature or hold the bond
to maturity, whereas, with a bond-warrant unit, the holder can keep the bond till maturity
and use the warrants to purchase stock. See generally Morreale, Original Issue Discount:
Guiding the Ventura Capital Company through the Maze, 32 J. oF TAxAT ON 2 (1970).
47 453 F.2d at 305.
48453 F.2d at 305, citing Note, The Tax Consequences of Convertible Bonds, 49
B.U.L. REv. 96, 112 (1969).
49 See note 40 supra.
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duction up to the time of conversion or recall. Then if the holder chose
to convert the issue into shares the taxpayer's return could be adjusted
to reflect the amounts already deducted.
Acquisitions of Loss Corporations
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 strictly prohibits the use by
individuals or corporations of tax deductions, credits or other such
allowances created through acquisitions where the purpose of the ac-
quisition is the avoidance or evasion of tax liability.0 The principal
intent of the original statute51 was to prevent reductions in tax liability
created by the wholesale purchase of "loss corporations" and the appli-
cation of their loss carryover 2 against current income. For many years,
G0 ItrERNAL REVENUE CODE of 1954 § 269 provides:
(a) In General.-If-(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940,directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or
(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940,
directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not controlled, directly
or indirectly, immediately before such asquisition, by such acquiring corpora-
tion or its stockholders, the basis of which property, in the hands of the
acquiring corporation, is determined by reference to the basis in the handsof the transferor corporation.
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or
avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or
other allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy,
then the Secretary or his delegate may disallow such deduction, credit, or other
allowance.
Thus not all acquisitions come under the control of § 269, but only those whose prin-
cipal purpose is judged to be distortion of the taxpayer's tax liability. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.269-2(b) (1962).
Control, for purposes of this section, is defined by Treas. Reg. § 1.269-1(c) (1962) as
ownership of at least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote of 50 percent of the total value of all shares of the corporation.
For an insight into direct and indirect control, see Feder, The Application of Section
269 to Corporations Having Net Operating Loss Carryovers and Potential Losses, N.Y.U.
21st INSr. ON F m. TAx 1277, 1281 (1963).
51 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE of 1989 § 129 was enacted in 1943 to combat the evasion
of the World War II excess profit tax through the acquisition of corporate control. H.R.
REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 49 (1943); 1944 Cum. BULL. 901, 919-20, 928-39; S.
REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); 1944 Cum. BurL. 973, 993-4, 1016-18. Indeed, it
seems that a "market" for defunct corporate shells was in existence. An advertisement in
the New York Times in 1943 read: "For Sale. Stock of corporation having 1943 tax loss
deduction $120,000. Sale assets are $80,000 in cash and equivalent." BrrrT and EusTicE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 16-21 n.43 (3d ed. 1971).
For a brief but concise development of the statute, see McDonald, Acquisition Made to
Evade or Avoid Income Tax, 14 U. So. CALIF. TAx INsT. 435, 436-38 (1962). See also Barnard,
Acquisitions for Tax Benefit, 34 CAL. L. REv. 36 (1946); Leake, Dividing Corporations and
Section 129, 30 TAxEs 603 (August, 1952); Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess
Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Internal Revenue Code, 58 HAv. L. Rnv. 196 (1944); Wales,
The Phipps Case, Section 129 and the Availability of Tax Advantage of an Acquired Cor-
poration, N.Y.U. 8rH IN sT. ON FED. TAx 920 (1949).
52 Under Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 172, a net operating loss deduction permits
the carryback and carryover of operating losses to the taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 1.172-2(a)
(1972) provides that
(a) net operating loss is sustained by a corporation in any taxable year beginning
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this section of the Code proved ineffective and was used infrequently
by the government. However, section 269 has now become one of the
Commissioner's most potent weapons 53
after December 31, 1953, if and to the extent that, for such year, there is an excess
of deductions allowed by chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 over
gross income computed thereunder.
However, carryover benefits are limited by section 382 of the Code. See Lanahan, Net
Operating Loss Deduction, 9th Tum. TAx INsT. 87, 117 (1960).
The development of section 582 was controversial. The House bill provided for an au-
tomatic decrease in the loss deduction once 50 percent or more of the stock changed hands.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954). The Senate bill required the continua-
tion of the business to obtain the benefit and, in addition, provided for the complete loss
of the benefit as a penalty. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954).
Under section 382(a), if the acquisition is accomplished by purchase and 50 percent
of the loss company's shares are purchased and the business of the loss corporation ceases
or is changed within a two-year period, the entire loss carryover benefit is lost. However,
if the acquisition is made as a result of a reorganization a partial disallowance of the
carryover will result based upon the percentage points below 20 percent of the outstanding
stock of the acquiring corporation received by the shareholders of the loss corporation.
IrT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 382(b). For example, when the former stockholders of a loss
corporation, after reorganization, own only 10 percent of the fair market value of the
acquiring corporation, the amount of the loss carryover is computed as follows: 20 percent
ownership (minimum) - 10 percent held = 10 percent. This figure is multiplied by 5
(disallowance penalty), resulting in 50 percent, which is the amount of the loss carry-
over allowed. For a fuller explanation, see Treas. Reg. § 1.382(b)-1(a) (1964).
When section 382(b) was enacted, there was some doubt as to whether section 269
might be inapplicable if section 382(b) was involved because of the wording in the Senate
Report. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1954). However, the Regulations have
dearly stated that section 269 may be applied whether or not reliance upon section 382(b)
is invalidated by the Commissioner. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-6, example (3). This closed an
apparent loophole which would have allowed a taxpayer to avoid § 269 by having the
stockholders of the loss corporation hold only 18 or 19 percent interest in the acquiring
corporation and subject the loss carryover to only the 5 percent penalty under § 382(b).
See generally Note, Net Operating Loss Carryovers and Corporate Adjustments: Retaining
an Advantageous Tax History under Libson Shops and § § 269, 381 and 382, 70 YALE L.J.
1201 (1960).
53 The law in the area is based upon the requirement established in Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 US. 465 (1935), that the business purpose of a transaction must be estab-
lished by a taxpayer who wishes to take advantage of an appendant tax benefit. See also
Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319
U.S. 436 (1943); J.D. & A.B. Sprechels Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 370 (1940).
Since INT. R.v. CODE of 1939, § 129 was general in scope, it proved extremely difficult to
predict accurately what actions were controlled by it. See Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid
Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Internal Revenue Code, 58 HAnv. L. REv.
196 (1944); Cohen, Exemptions and Credits of Multiple Corporations: Section 15(c) and
129, 1953 So. CALrF TAx INsT. 1. For many years after its passage, there was uncertainty in
the Tax Court as to whether a corporation could be deprived of its own tax benefit be-
cause of the dictum expressed in Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948), which stated
that the statute only prohibited the use of the deduction, credit or allowance to an ac-
quiring corporation but not to the acquired corporation.
Some recent cases have erased this erroneous dictum and made § 269 one of the Com-
missioner's most effective weapons. Adopting the "benefit theory" in Thomas E. Snyder
Sons Co., 34 T.C. 400 (1960), aff'd, 288 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1961), the Tax Court gave the
statute a much broader sweep by including both acquiring and acquired corporations, and
thus aligning its views with those of the circuit courts. See Commissioner v. British Motor
Car Distributors, Ltd., 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1960); James Realty Co. v. United States, 280
F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960).
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In Pepi, Inc. v. Commissioner,54 petitioner attempted to reduce
its tax liability by application of a loss carryover sustained by a prede-
cessor corporation. Pepi was a member of a conglomerate known as
American Philips. Prior to World War II, the American assets of Dutch
Philips were placed in a trust fund located in a U.S. bank. Following
the war, the American Philips group, interested in expansion, formed
a committee to investigate possible alternatives.
Simultaneously, A. Hollander & Sons, Inc., which had suffered
losses in the fur business from 1953 through the first half of 1956, pro-
ceeded, upon the advice of a member of the Philips expansion commit-
tee, to retain Wallace A. Collins, 5 an attorney, to assist in its revitaliza-
tion.58
Shedding its unprofitable fur business upon the advice of Collins,
Hollander proceeded to negotiate a merger with the Brook Chemical
Co.57 However, since it lacked the necessary capital to procure a loan
for the merger, Hollander enlisted the cooperation of the Philips ex-
pansion committee.
The necessary funds were obtained when the Schuyler Corpora-
tion,58 an affiliate of Philips, offered Hollander the use of a $1.6 million
debenture to be used as collateral. As compensation for the loan, Schuy-
ler Corporation received $32,000 and an agreement by which they
could force the merger of Hollander with a third party meeting certain
qualifications.
Upon the recommendation of the American Philips expansion
committee, Schuyler assigned its agreement with Hollander to Philips
Industries. In turn, a merger was executed with the surviving corpora-
tion, Hollander, changing its name to Philips Electronics, Inc., prede-
cessor corporation to Pepi, Inc. Since Hollander had suffered prior
losses in the fur business, its successor attempted to utilize these losses
in the reduction of its tax liability for 1958 and 1959. The Commis-
sioner disallowed the deduction, contending the principal purpose of
the acquisition was the evasion or avoidance of tax liability. The Tax
54 448 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1971).
55 Collins had been counsel for the Philips group in a prior merger acquisition in
which Philips acquired a spring manufacturing concern that had a $750,000 loss carryover.
The successor corporation attempted to make use of the loss as a tax benefit but it was
partially disallowed under INT. REV. CODF of 1954, § 382. 448 F.2d at 143 n.l.
50 In addition to retaining Collins, Hollander dismissed its old accountants and hired
the same public accounting firm engaged by the American Philips group.
57 Brook Chemical Company was a profitable operation which had a cash purchase
value of $2.8 million dollars.
58 Schuyler Corporation was controlled by a foundation which had been established
as a welfare fund for the employees of Dutch Philips. It was to serve as an investment
service on behalf of the welfare fund in the United States.
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Court affirmed the Commissioner 59 and the court of appeals also af-
firmed 60 concluding that petitioner had not shown sufficient evidence
to disprove the Commissioner's contention of tax avoidance or eva-
sion.61 The court indicated that the entire chain of events beginning
with retention of the same accounting firm and counsel as employed
by Philips and culminating in the actual merger according to the Hol-
lander-Schuyler agreement was more than coincidental.
Pepi unsuccessfully attempted to inject some valid "business pur-
poses" 62 by showing the importance of the indirect acquisition of
59 Pepi Corp. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 854 (1969).
60 448 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1971).
61 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 269 (c), an addition to the law that existed under section
129 of the 1939 Code, provides that
The fact the consideration paid upon an acquisition by any person or corporation
described in subsection (a) is substantially disproportionate to the aggregate-
(1) of the adjusted basis of the property of the corporation... and
(2) of the tax benefits (to the extent not reflected in the adjusted basis of the
property) not available to such persons or corporation otherwise than
as a result of such acquisition,
shall be prima fade evidence of the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance of
Federal income tax.
Treas. Reg. § 1.269-5(b) (1962) states that the Commissioner's determination of whether
an acquisition is made for the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance of income tax is
presumptively correct. Thus the burden of overcoming this presumption by a preponder-
ance of evidence falls upon the taxpayer. See Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co. v. Commissioner,
288 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1961); American Pipe and Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 125
(9th Cir. 1957). See also RtAru AND JoHNsoN, FEDERAL INcOME, GIFT AND EsTATE TAXATION
§§ 72.03, 72.04. However, there is some basis for the evaporation of the presumption once
the taxpayer has introduced his evidence. American Pipe and Steel v. Commissioner, 243
F.2d 125, 126 (9th Cir. 1957). For a discussion of section 29(c) see Peterson, Corporate Ac-
quisitions for Tax Avoidance Purposes: The Ever-Tightening "Loophole," 19 J. OF TAXA-
UON 1963 322, 323-24 (1963).
62 Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(a)(2) (1962) states:
If the purpose to evade or avoid Federal income tax exceeds in importance any
other purpose, it is the principal purpose.
However:
The determination of the purpose for which an acquisition was made requires a
security of the entire circumstances in which the transaction or course of conduct
occurred, in connection with the tax result claimed to arise therefrom.
It is interesting to note that other sections of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with
avoidance of tax liability require that such a motivation constitute either "a major pur-
pose" as in § 1551 or "one of the principal purposes", (INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 302
(c)(2)(b), 306(b)(4), 367, 532(a) and 552(b)(2)) of the transaction. See Malat v. Riddell,
383 U.S. 569 (1966). Compare Baton Rouge Supply Co., 36 T.C. 1 (1961) (the taxpayer, in
need of an adjoining parcel of land, attempted to purchase it directly. He was informed
that the only way possession would be given to him was through a stock purchase of the
loss corporation. The deal was consummated and it was only after the purchase that the
taxpayer learned of that tax advantage. The court held the principal purpose of the ac-
quisition was business need) with Goodwyn Crockery Co., 37 T.C. 355 (1961), aff'd, 315
F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1963) (the stock of a loss corporation, engaged in the manufacture of
household goods, was acquired by Goodwyn which, also purchased the assets of another
company engaged in a similar business. The court found that the principal purpose of the
acquisition was the expansion of the business, thus allowing the tax benefit even though
its existence was known prior to the acquisition).
Many decisions have rejected claims of a valid business purpose. See, e.g., J.T. Slocomb,
38 T.C. 752 (1962), aff'd, 334 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964) (the court decided there was no
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Brook. But the very fact that Brook was acquired indirectly rendered
this contention unsatisfactory. A weaker argument was Pepi's conten-
tion that Hollander's listing on the New York Stock Exchange was of
significant value to Pepi. But, as the court pointed out, had an adequate
investigation been made, it would have revealed that the listing would
be unavailable after the merger.63
Finally, petitioner contended that the consideration given ex-
ceeded the tax benefit that could have been received. However, in
reality the assets acquired equalled Hollander's expenditure without con-
sideration of the $815,000 tax benefit that would be received. 64 Thus
the court maintained that Pepi had failed to produce adequate docu-
mentary evidence (such as corporate minutes, records, letters, memos,
and resolutions)6 proving the valid business purpose of the acquisition.
Once the burden of proof has shifted to the taxpayer, the above evi-
dence is essential.
If Hollander had acquired Brook without the assistance of the
Philips affiliate, by using normal commercial channels, combined with
an adequate showing of corporate records indicating the importance
and value66 of the acquisition, the court might have looked more favor-
principal business purpose for the acquisition. Taxpayer there had acquired a firm
producing micrometers but did nothing to expand the business. The court rejected the
argument that the principal purpose was business diversification); Zanesville Investment
Co., 38 T.C. 406 (1962); Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co., 34 T.C. 400 (1960), aff'd, 288 F.2d
36 (7th Cir. 1961); R.P. Collins & Co. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 602 (D.C. Mass. 1961),
aff'd, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962) (taxpayer made initial attempt to revitalize the loss
corporation but abandoned the effort after two months and changed the nature of the
business. The court denied the taxpayer the benefit of the carryover losses as well as the
post acquisition operating losses. The attempt to revitalize the loss corporation was given
no effect).
For a more complete look at postacquisition losses and how they are affected by
the denial of preacquisition losses, see Note, The Influence of Disallowed Preacquisition
Losses on the Recognition of Postacquisition Losses Under Section 269, 10 Wr. AND M. L.
REv. 169 (1968); Maher, Sales and Acquisition of Loss Corporations, N.Y.U. 28THs INsT.
ON FEm. TAx 165, 178-79 (1970).
63 448 F2d at 145-46.
64 Id. at 146.
65 In searching for motives in acquisition cases, the courts have looked to minutes of
director and shareholder meetings. See, e.g., F.C. Publication Liquidating Corp., 36 T C.
836 (1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1962); Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951). In
addition, courts have also reviewed proxy statements and letters to the shareholders
(American Pipe and Steel Corp., 25 T.C. 851 (1955), aff'd, 243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957)); inter-office correspondence (James Realty Co. v. United
States, 176 F. Supp. 306 (D.C. Minn. 1959), aff'd, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960)); offers of
acquisition (Spingolo Warehouse Co., 37 T.C. 1 (1961)); and correspondence between the
parties (Hawaiian Trust Co. Ltd. v. United States, 291 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1961)).
66 Petitioner should have shown the worth of the acquisition of Brook Chemical Co.
and its listing on the New York Stock Exchange at between $2.7 to $4.0 million dollars.
The court would then have been forced to look at petitioner's claim from a business view
point.
For a brief summary of criteria to be met in avoiding section 269 complications, see
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ably upon the petitioner's contention of a valid business purpose.
Absent these countervailing circumstances, the court considered the
acquisition primarily a means of tax avoidance.
Installment Method of Reporting Income
Section 453 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 gives the tax-
payer the option of reporting sales income in installments over the
period during which he will receive payment.67 The section is limited
in application to either "dealers in personal property"' 8 or "sales of
realty and casual sales of personalty."69 To take advantage of this option
Feder, The Application of Section 269 to Corporations Having Net Operating Loss Carry-
overs and Potential Losses, N.Y.U. 21sr. INsr. ON FED. TAX 1277, 1293 (1963).
67 Under INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 453, the seller can spread the gain received over
the period of receipt and also allocate part of each receipt to the recovery of his basis.
It should be recognized that the installment method is applicable only to gains and not
losses. When a taxpayer sustains a loss on what normally would qualify as an installment
sale, it is deductible only in the taxable year in which the sale is made not when payments
are collected. Rev. Rul. 70-430 1970, INT. REv. BuLL. No. 34, at 8. For an all inclusive
discussion of section 453 see Emory, The Installment Method of Reporting Income: Its
Election, Use, and Effect, 53 CoRNE. L. Rav. 181 (1968).
68 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 453(a)(1) provides:
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, a person who
regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property on the installment plan
may return as income therefrom in any taxable year that proportion of the in-
stallment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit, realized
or to be realized when payment is complete, bears to the total contract price.
Id. (emphasis added).
"Total contract price" includes carrying charges and interest in addition to the fair market
value of any trade-in or other consideration received by the dealer. INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 453(a)(2).
The Code permits the reporting of revolving credit sales using the installment
methods but requires the sampling of accounts to determine what percentage of the
total qualifies for such treatment. For a complete discussion see Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(d)
(1958) and Rev. Proc. 65-5, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 720; Rev. Proc. 64-4, 1964-1 Cus. BuLL. 644.
Election of the installment method by a dealer in personal property must be indicated
on an income tax return for the taxable year of the election. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(a)(1958)
and Rev. Rul. 67-147, 1967-1 Cum. BuLL. 105.
69 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 453(b)(1) provides:
GENERAL RuLE - Income from-
(A) a sale or other disposition of real property, or
(B) a casual sale or other casual disposition of personal property (other than
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the
taxpayer if on hand at the dose of the taxable year) for a price exceeding
$1,000
may (under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate) be returned
on the basis and in the manner prescribed in subsection (a) [Installment Method].
Id.
The above section is limited by section 453(a)(2) which restricts its application to a
situation where annual payments do not exceed 30 percent of the selling price. This sub-
division of section 453 creates a pitfall to its proper use. The "selling price" is composed
of the gross sale price, including cash, notes and other property received by the seller,
plus any liabilities assumed or paid by the buyer. Rev. Rul. 60-52, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 186.
There is the danger that imputed interest will not be deducted from the selling price
and total contract price. Thus, the selling price will be incorrectly inflated and the
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the taxpayer must indicate his election on his tax return.7 0
Petitioner in Billy Rose's Diamond Horseshoe, Inc. v. United
States7' sought to elect the use of Section 453(b)(1) in reporting pay-
ments received from a lessee in lieu of an obligation to restore the
leased premises.
During 1955 petitioner leased a theatre building including furni-
ture and fixtures to the National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (NBC).
The lease contained a covenant whereby NBC was to restore the prem-
ises to the same condition that existed when initially leased. Prior to
the expiration of the lease NBC and the petitioner entered into an
agreement which provided that the petitioner was to receive $300,000
in full satisfaction for NBC's obligation to restore the building. Pay-
ment was to be accomplished through three promissory notes beginning
September 4, 1962. Taxpayer, seeking to elect the installment method
for the restoration payments, gave notice of his income tax return for
the fiscal year ending August 31, 1962.
The Commissioner determined the three notes received as restora-
tion payments were reportable in the fiscal year ending August 31,
1962 and not entitled to be treated as an installment because they did
amount received during a period may exceed the 80% limitation. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1
(b)(2)(1958); See also Levy, Installment Sales of Real Estate, N.Y.U. 25TH INsT. ON FED. TAX
29, 86 (1967).
If there are any payments during the year of sale (initial payments), they will include
the buyer's downpayment, installment payments and accrued liabilities of the seller dis-
charged by the buyer. In safeguarding the use of this section, by remaining within the
30 percent limitation, the time of the completed sale becomes important, since advance
payments in a prior year may be included in the initial payment. Newaygo Portland
Cement Co., 27 B.T.A. 1097 (1933), aff'd, 77 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Daniel Rosenthal,
82 T.C. 225 (1959). See generally Emory, The Installment Method of Reporting Income: Its
Election, Use, and Effect, 53 CoaN L. L. R v. 181, 193 (1968).
Some difficulties have also arisen with the use of debentures in corporate acquisitions.
Installment Reporting of Gain on Receipt of Bonds in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 J.
TAXATION 198 (1969).
70 Election of the installment method must be made in the taxpayer's return for the
year of sale. In addition, the election must specify the type or types of sales transacted.
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(a)(2) (1958). Originally the election had to be made on the original
return and not on an amended return. WA. & Lorrene B. Ireland, 82 T.C. 994 (1959).
But now the taxpayer may make the election on a timely amended return, provided that
no inconsistent election was made on the original return. Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 Cum.
BULL. 152. For a discussion of election of the installment method see Lane, Timely Election
of the Installment Method of Reporting Section 453(b) Sales: Murky Waters, 18 ABA
TAXATION SEctioN 47 (April 1965); Horn, Taxation of Installment and Deferred Payment
Sales, 9rH TuLA TAx INT. 628 (1960).
Section 453(c) was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to allow the taxpayer to
retroactively revoke his election of the installment sales method by filing a notice of
revocation. The revocation would apply to the year installment reporting was elected in
addition to all subsequent years. However, once the taxpayer has revoked his election he
cannot reelect the method for a period of five years. See Mulvey, New Law Permits Tax-
payer to take a Second Look at Installment Elections, 32 J. or TAXATION 149 (March 1970).
71448 F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1971).
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not constitute income from a "sale." The district court affirmed the
Commissioner's contention.72
In affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that the
restoration transaction was not entitled to application of the install-
ment method since it was not a "sale or other disposition" as required
by section 453.78 The Second Circuit has, for many years, held that such
releases of contract rights and cancellations are not "sales."' 4
However, the taxpayer contended that section 1241 of the Code75
and the decision in Commissioner v. Ferre7 6 had diminished the valid-
ity of the above cases. The court rejected this argument and pointed
out that section 1241 applies only to the two stated situations: cancella-
tion of a lease by lessee or cancellation of a distributor's agreement.77
Furthermore, the court held that the decision in Ferrer has not over-
ruled the Second Circuit previous decisions on the issue, but is distin-
guished on the ground that the rights sold could have been sold to any
third party.78
72322 F. Supp. 76 ($.D.N.Y. 1971).
78 "The term sale has inherent in it a transaction which, when finally completed, will
dispose of title to property." Horn, Taxation of Installment and Deferred Payment Sales,
9rH TuLANE TAx INsr. 622 (1960).
74Pittston Co. v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919
(1958) (cancellation of an exclusive contract to purchase a coal company's entire output
did not constitute a sale); General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 860 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 US. 866 (1953) (payments received by a taxpayer for transfer of its con-
tract were not a sale). See also Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
The term "sale" has often been the subject of judicial review. In Commissioner v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1965), the Court stated that since a "sale" is a common event
in the non-tax world and not limited by the Code, it should be given its common and
ordinary meaning. Yet passage of title is not the keystone of a sale or disposition under
section 453. Charles J. Derbes, 24 B.T.A. 276, 283 (1931). Title eventually must pass, but
is not essential that it do so with the initial payment in an installment contract. Treas.
Reg. § 1.453-2(a)(1958).
75 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1241. Cancellation of Lease or Distributor's Agreement:
Amounts received by a lessee for the cancellation of lease, or by a distributor of
goods for the cancellation of a distributor's agreement (if the distributor has a
substantial capital investment in the distributorship), shall be considered as
amounts received in exchange for such lease or agreement.
76 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962). In Ferrer, a taxpayer who held a lease to produce a
play and prevent filming until after production received a gain from a sale in surrendering
such rights.
77 The court cited the Senate Report which makes clear the legislative intent in limit-
ing the scope of the statute: "The section is limited in scope and it does not constitute
a re-examination of present law relating to contracts to which the section does not
specifically apply." 448 F.2d at 552, citing S. RE'. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 115 (1954).
78 448 F. 2d at 552. It appears other circuits have taken a somewhat different approach
to defining what is a "sale." For example the Ninth Circuit in Dorman v. United States,
296 F.2d 27 (1961), held the abandonment of an option to acquire a partnership interest
constituted a sale or exchange of capital. In Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953), the court held a lessee's surrender of his lease
to the lessor was a sale or exchange of capital. See also Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390
(5th Cir.), cert. denied., 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner,
282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
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Petitioner might have avoided his tax problem by allowing NBC
to make $300,000 worth of lease-hold improvements which are not
taxable as rent.79
In the alternative, petitioner could have waived his right to re-
storation and entered into a new lease for 1 or 2 years. Shortly there-
after NBC could have given the petitioner three notes for $300,000 for
the cancellation of the new lease thus coming within section 1241 of
the Code and also entitling the petitioner to elect the installment
method of reporting income under section 453.
It is apparent from this case that the decision in Ferrer will not
change the long-standing rule that taxpayers will only be allowed the
use of section 453 when the sale includes the release of rights which can
be sold.
ESTATE TAXATION
Valuation of Mutual Funds for Estate Tax Purposes
Most mutual funds (Funds) have both "bid" and "asked" prices.80
The "bid" price is the net asset value of the Fund., The Fund is re-
quired by law82 to redeem its shares at this "bid" price. Except for a
negligible few, Fund shareholders liquidate their investments by the
redemption method. 8 The "asked" price is the amount at which the
Fund's marketing agency will sell a share to the public and consists of
the "bid" price plus a commission of approximately eight percent for
the marketeers. 84
Treasury regulations require a Fund to be valued at its "asked"
79 INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 109. But the improvements may not be a sham in an
attempt to conceal the payment of rent. Treas. Reg. § 1.109-1 (1972).
80 See Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 871 (1968), af'd sub nom., Ruehlmann v.
Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 US. 950 (1970), citing the
Scudder, Stevens and Clark Common Stock Fund, Inc., as an example of a mutual fund
having the same "bid" and "asked" price.
81 Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. pending, defines the
net asset value as follows:
The "net asset value" is computed daily as of the close of trading on the New
York Stock Exchange. The total assets are valued and the total outstanding
liabilities, including all reserves and accrued expenses, are subtracted. The re-
sulting net worth is divided by the number of shares outstanding to determine the
"net asset value" per share of capital stock. This is generally described as the
"bid" price in the financial pages.
Id. at 568 n.1.8 2 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (1970).
83 See Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 871, 873 (1968). See also Howell v. United States,
414 F.2d 45, 47 (7th Cir. 1969).
84 The commission covers the marketing agencies' expenses and profit but does not
provide for the Fund's management. Cartwright v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 769, 771
(W.D.N.Y. 1971). The management expenses are paid from the Fund's dividends. Brief
for Petitioner at 33, Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1972).
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